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0003-3472/$38.00  2010 The Association for the Stu
doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.09.030People’s affective or emotional state can alter their cognitive processing, biasing interpretation of
ambiguous stimuli. Those in a more positive state interpret such stimuli in a more optimistic manner
than those in a negative state. Recently this research has extended to animals, and has shown that
manipulations associated with negative affect cause animals to interpret ambiguous stimuli more
pessimistically. We investigated whether exposure to environmental enrichment engenders optimistic
responses to ambiguous stimuli. Rats, Rattus norvegicus, were trained on a novel conditional discrimi-
nation task whereby they learned the correct response necessary to obtain a food reward given the
stimulus present during approach (rough or smooth sandpaper). One stimulus was associated with
a higher-value reward than the other. Once the rats were trained, cognitive bias was probed by exploring
their responses to an ambiguous stimulus (intermediate grade of sandpaper); a rat was deﬁned as
optimistic if it chose the response appropriate to the stimulus associated with the better reward. Animals
transferred from unenriched to enriched cages showed more optimistic responses following the change.
A control group maintained in unenriched cages showed pessimistic responses throughout. These results
demonstrate for the ﬁrst time that environmental enrichment can induce an optimistic cognitive bias in
rats previously housed in standard caging, possibly indicative of a more positive affective state. These
results add support to the suggestion that measuring cognitive biases can give an insight into animal
emotional states; this has implications for animal welfare and preclinical testing of potential therapeutics
for mood disorders.
 2010 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.It is well established in humans that affective state can inﬂuence
many aspects of cognition (Williams et al. 1997; Haselton et al.
2009). Affectively induced cognitive biases have been described
in relation to the information attended to, how it is interpreted and
how it is remembered (Leppanen 2006; Bar-Haim et al. 2007; Coen
et al. 2009; Inaba & Ohira 2009). For example, socially anxious
people interpret the emotional valence (strength of positivity or
negativity) of ambiguous statements (e.g. ‘that is an interesting
shirt you have on’) more negatively than nonanxious individuals
(Wells & Matthews 1996; Amir et al. 2005). Therefore, testing an
individual’s interpretation of ambiguous stimuli can potentially
reveal something about their emotional state. In recent years there
has been a move towards using techniques involving interpretation
of ambiguous stimuli in nonhuman animals (hereafter referred to
as animals), in an attempt to assess their affective state (Paul et al.
2005; Mendl et al. 2009).rdiovascular Science, QMRI,
inburgh, EH16 4TJ, U.K.
. Brydges).
viour and Evolution, Institute
e Building for Neuroecology,
.K.
dy of Animal Behaviour. PublishedCertain aspects of animal welfare, such as biological function,
are relatively straightforward to measure (e.g. productivity,
immune and reproductive function or growth rate; Dwyer &
Bornett 2004; Klasing 2007). However, mental or subjective
experiences are less tractable, as animals cannot communicate
their experiences to us verbally. Current attitudes suggest that
modern assessments of animal welfare should be expanded to
include measurements of subjective experience, and should focus
on positive as well as negative affect (Desire et al. 2002; Boissy
et al. 2007; Broom 2007; Dawkins 2008). It has been suggested
that cognitive assays could provide an indirect way of measuring
subjective experiences, and a variety of such assays have been
suggested (Paul et al. 2005; Brydges & Braithwaite 2008). One
particularly promising avenue appears to be the cognitive bias
approach. Mendl et al. (2009) have enumerated several potential
advantages of this approach, including: the ability to make a priori
predictions for different species; speciﬁc measurement of
emotional valence; the strong correlation between cognitive bia-
ses and subjectively experienced emotion in humans; and the
potential to measure positive, as well as negative, affect. However,
the reality of these advantages remains to be demonstrated in
animal studies.by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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mental manipulations chosen to induce negative affect also
produce pessimistic cognitive biases in animals’ responses to
ambiguous stimuli (reviewed in Mendl et al. 2009). In the ﬁrst of
the studies, Harding et al. (2004) trained rats, Rattus norvegicus, to
press a lever to obtain a food reward in response to one ‘training’
tone (the positive stimulus) and to refrain from pressing in
response to a different ‘training’ tone (the negative stimulus) to
avoid a burst of aversive white noise. After the rats had learned this
discrimination, they were exposed to probe tones that were inter-
mediate between the two trained tones. Those animals housed in
unstable conditions (hypothesized to promote mildly ‘depressive’
effects) showed longer response latencies and tended to respond
less often to the ‘positive event’ tone and probe tones close to it. The
authors interpreted these ﬁndings to suggest that unstable housing
induces negative (or ‘pessimistic’) cognitive bias in rats. Following
this pioneering study, a number of experimenters have further
investigated how environmental manipulation affects judgement
biases in animals. For example, removal of environmental enrich-
ment or exposure to anxiety-inducing conditions increases ‘pessi-
mistic’ judgements in both rats (Burman et al. 2008a, b, 2009) and
European starlings, Sturnus vulgaris (Bateson & Matheson 2007;
Matheson et al. 2008). Furthermore, both congenitally helpless
rats (a genetic model of animal depression) and starlings with
locomotor stereotypies (which are often interpreted as indicative of
inadequate housing) showmore pessimistic judgement biases than
normal animals (Enkel et al. 2009; Brilot et al. 2010). Thus there is
mounting evidence that cognitive bias could be a useful tool for
assessing both state and trait negative affect in animals.
Despite evidence from humans that positive affect is associated
with greater optimism (e.g. Nygren et al. 1996; Waters 2008),
animal studies have so far failed to demonstrate clear optimistic
judgement biases in response to manipulations designed to induce
positive affect (Bateson & Matheson 2007). The aim of this study
was therefore to explore whether cognitive bias can be used to
measure positive affect in rats experiencing a sudden improvement
in environmental conditions for the ﬁrst time in their lives.
In this studywe developed a novel cognitive bias test for rodents
logically identical to two of the tasks previously used with starlings
(Matheson et al. 2008; Brilot et al. 2010). Unlike the original
Harding et al. (2004) go/no-go task described above, our rats were
required to respond to both the positive and the negative cues by
making an active choice response. We have argued that this design
reduces the likelihood of confounds caused by changes in activity or
motivation to feed inherent in a go/no-go task (Matheson et al.
2008; see also Enkel et al. 2009 for similar arguments). In the rat
version of our task the positive stimulus (either ﬁne- or coarse-
grade sandpaper) was associated with a high-value reward (choc-
olate) and the negative stimulus (the opposite grade of sandpaper
to the positive stimulus) with a lower-value reward (cereal). Rats
will forage for both of these rewards, but are assumed to have
a strong preference for chocolate over cereal. We chose not to use
a punishment (white noise or electric shock) as in previous rat
studies for two reasons: ﬁrst, it has been hypothesized that tasks
using positive and neutral reinforcers might be best at detecting
positive affect or ‘happiness’ (Mendl et al. 2009); and second, we
were concerned that repeated experience of punishers during daily
cognitive bias testing might itself affect the state of the animals
adversely. As enrichment has been used in previous animal tests of
cognitive bias, and is widely thought to improve animal welfare
(Garner 2005; Swaisgood & Shepherdson 2005), we tested the
responses of rats to ambiguous probe cues before and after the
addition of environmental enrichment, with the hypothesis that
provision of enrichment would induce optimistic shift in cognitive
bias. Rats were chosen for the study as they are among the mostcommonly used animals in biological research. Therefore, the
successful development of the cognitive bias protocol in this
species has profound implications both for the assessment of
welfare and as a potential new research tool in the preclinical
testing of mood-altering therapeutics.
METHODS
Subjects and Housing
We used 12 male Sprague Dawley rats (bred from an in-house
colony and raised by their own mothers at the University of Edin-
burgh), approximately 6 months old at the start of testing. Post-
weaning but before experiments began (i.e. weaning to 6 months),
rats were housed in two groups of six in standard cages
(61 x 43.5 cm and 21.5 cm high, Techniplast) lined with wood
shavings (Lillico) but containing no environmental enrichment on
a 12:12 h light:dark cycle and fed standard rat chow (RM1, Special
Diet Services, Lillico, Surrey, U.K.) and water ad libitum. Tempera-
ture and humidity were maintained between 19 and 21 C and 45
and 60%, respectively. Rats were identiﬁed using rings of perma-
nent marker around the tail. Rats were killed using a schedule one
method (cervical dislocation) at the end of the experiment.
Apparatus
In a room separate to the housing area we set up a simple maze
consisting of a clear Perspex start box (61 x 43.5 cm and 21.5 cm
high) connected to a clear Perspex goal box (61 x 43.5 cm and
21.5 cm high) via a large piece of white Perspex drainpipe (diameter
10 cm, length 80 cm). The goal box contained two foraging bowls
(diameter 9 cm, height 5 cm) one black, one white, and the entire
maze was set on a bench side (1 m high) under regular room
lighting (Fig. 1).
Habituation
To habituate rats to the food rewards and maze apparatus, we
handled each rat for 10 min daily and fed it food items to be used as
rewards in the task (white chocolate drops and Honey Nut
Cheerios) for 5 days (phase A). For the next 5 days, we also placed
rats into the maze apparatus for 5 min per day (phase B). During
this phase, the foraging bowls were ﬁlled with scented sand. One
foraging bowlwas ﬁlled with coriander-scented sand (1% byweight
coriander), and the other with cinnamon-scented sand (1% by
weight cinnamon). For each rat, each reward was speciﬁcally paired
with a particular bowl colour and scent, and a particular bowl
colour was either on the left or the right of the goal box, and this
arrangement remained consistent for each individual throughout
the experiment (e.g. chocolate reward always in black cinnamon
bowl on left, Cheerio reward always in white coriander bowl on
right), but was randomized between individuals. These pairings
were counterbalanced between treatment groups (enriched versus
unenriched). The inside of the tunnel linking the start and goal
boxes was completely lined with Silicon Carbide Waterproof
sandpaper (3M, U.K.; P600 grade; this was different to the sand-
paper used in later phases) to habituate rats to the presence of
sandpaper in the tunnel. This complete lining facilitated maximal
contact between the rat (feet and whiskers) and the surface of the
sandpaper.
Training
During phase C, each rat underwent four training trials per day
in the maze apparatus for a period of 5 days, two between 0900
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of maze apparatus with details of choice outcomes in the task. In this example, coarse sandpaper is associated with chocolate in a black cinnamon-
scented bowl, and ﬁne sandpaper with a Cheerio in a white coriander-scented bowl. In a ‘chocolate’ (high-value reward) trial, the reward for a correct choice was half a chocolate
drop. In the ‘Cheerio’ (low-value reward) trial, the reward for a correct choice was half a Cheerio.
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hours (pm trials). During a trial, a reward (half a white chocolate
drop or Honey Nut Cheerio) was placed on to the surface of the sand
in the corresponding bowl. White chocolate drops were used as
‘high-value’ rewards and Honey Nut Cheerios as ‘low-value’
rewards. It was assumed that rats would value and be motivated to
forage for both chocolate and Cheerios, as they are both sweet and
it is well known that many mammals, including rats, have a strong
preference for sweet foods (Vigues et al. 2009). Chocolate drops
were assumed to be valuedmore highly than Cheerios for a number
of reasons. First, they have greater caloriﬁc value and sugar content
(around 3 kcal and 0.34 g sugar per half chocolate drop versus
0.4 kcal and 0.07 g sugar per half Cheerio). Second, we observed
during habituation that rats ate the chocolate faster than the
Cheerios. Furthermore, during all rewarded phases, rats exited the
tunnel and located the reward faster for the chocolate compared
with the Cheerio reward (see Results). Previous studies have shown
that shorter choice latencies are correlated with preference during
foraging (Bateson & Kacelnik 1995), and pilot data from one of our
laboratories shows that rats prefer chocolate over Cheerios when
given a straight choice (M. Bateson & M. Leach, personal observa-
tion). During a trial, rats were placed individually into the start box.
The experimenter then started a timer and recorded the time taken
for the rat to leave the start box and exit the tunnel, to choose
a bowl (and which bowl was chosen: bowl with or without reward,
correct and incorrect bowls, respectively), and to choose the reward
(correct) bowl (if not chosen ﬁrst). A choice was determined when
a rat began digging in a particular bowl. Each rat received two trials
for a chocolate drop, and two for a Cheerio per day. The order of
these trials was determined independently by randomization, andwas altered daily. Waterproof sandpaper of different grades (P60
coarse and P1200 ﬁne; Faithfull Tools, Dartford, Kent, U.K.) was
placed inside the tunnel and associated with the rewards. Half of
the rats had coarse sandpaper (P60) during the chocolate trials and
ﬁne sandpaper (P1200) during the Cheerio trials, and vice versa for
the other half of the individuals. This was counterbalanced between
groups. This enabled rats to associate a particular grade of sand-
paper with a particular reward, and so eventually choose the
correct bowl ﬁrst time upon entering the goal box (e.g. for one
individual, coarse sandpaper was associated with chocolate located
in a white cinnamon bowl on the right). To avoid possible effects of
odour cues, sandpaper was changed between rats, and the appa-
ratus cleaned with a small amount of 70% ethanol.
After completion of phase C, rats entered phaseD. During phase D
(5 days), the same protocol was followed as in phase C, except the
depth at which the rewards were buried in the sand progressively
increased,until theywereat thebottomof the foragingbowlbyday5.
Next rats entered phase E; again the same basic protocol was
followed as in phase C, but here rewards were always buried at the
bottomof the sand and one out of the four trials carried out each day
(chosen at random) was not rewarded. Correct responses (a correct
responsewas deﬁned as the rat choosing the usually rewarded bowl
ﬁrst) on these unrewarded trials would indicate that rats were not
simply using cues from the reward itself (e.g. olfactory cues) to
guide decisions. Rats were removed from themaze after their initial
choice. Performance (i.e. correct versus incorrect responding) was
not affected by the presence or absence of reward (see Results),
suggesting that such cues were not used by the rats. Partial rein-
forcement also slows extinction learning in the unreinforced probe
trials, and this method has been previously used to increase the
N.M. Brydges et al. / Animal Behaviour 81 (2011) 169e175172number of possible probe trials run without inducing extinction
(Bateson & Matheson 2007; Matheson et al. 2008). The duration of
this phase depended on individual learning. Rats were moved onto
the next phase when they completed at least three out of four trials
correctly per day for 5 days in a row, at which point we assumed
they had learned the discrimination.
In phase F, the same protocol was followed as in phase E except
that during the randomly chosen unrewarded trial, an intermediate
grade of sandpaper (P180) was used as a probe instead of the
sandpaper that normally corresponded to this reward. These probe
trials continued for 5 days (total of ﬁve probes per rat per week).
Owing to individual learning rates, rats entered and ﬁnished phase
F at different times. During the interim, those that ﬁnished ﬁrst
weremoved back onto phase D (D2), with the reward always buried
at the bottom of the sand.
Phase G began when all rats had completed phase F. At this
stage, rats were already housed in two social groups, but in phase G
(1week), these groups were randomly allocated as either ‘enriched’
or ‘unenriched’ treatment groups. Those in the enriched group
were moved into a larger, plastic-based metal cage (70 x 45 cm and
54 cm high; ‘the manor’, Pet World Direct, Eye, Suffolk, U.K.) lined
with a deep layer of wood shavings and enrichments were added
(two cardboard tubes, two cardboard houses, four wooden blocks
and one plastic house (57.2 x 18.4 cm and 18.4 cm high; Super Pet,
Elk Grove Village, IL, U.S.A.)). Those in the unenriched group were
moved to a new cage that was identical to their old one
(61 x 43.5 cm and 21.5 cm high, lined with wood shavings but
containing no environmental enrichment). During this phase, rats
were trained using the same protocol as phase D (D2), to ensure
they continued to retain the task.
After 1 week of treatment (enrichment/no enrichment), rats
entered phase F2. This followed the same protocol as phase F, with
four trials a day per rat for 5 days, with one probe trial per day.5 
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Figure 2. Mean number of optimistic choices during ﬁve probe trials pretreatment and
post-treatment for enriched and unenriched groups. Error bars represent 1 SE. Bars
connected by an asterisk are signiﬁcantly different from one another.Data Analysis
Data were analysed using general linear models (GLMs). In all
cases, we checked the underlying assumptions of normality of error
and homogeneity of variance. Given no evidence to suggest that
these assumptions were violated, we proceeded with analysis of
untransformed data. Nonsigniﬁcant factors were removed in
a stepwise manner to produce minimal models. Models are pre-
sented in full here; results are for minimal models.
The ﬁrst GLM assessed the effects of treatment (enriched versus
unenriched), time point (pre- versus post-treatment), treat-
ment  time point and rat (a randomvariable nested within group)
on the number of optimistic choices (i.e. responding as if on
a chocolate trial during a probe trial) rats made during the probe
trials (during phases F and F2); a second GLM assessed the effects of
treatment, experimental phase (all phases) and rat (a random
variable nested within treatment) on weight; a third looked at the
effect of treatment on number of trials to learn the task presented
in phase E; and a fourth investigated the effects of treatment,
experimental phase (E, F and F2 only, phases in which one random
trial a day was unrewarded), rat (a random variable nested within
treatment), presence/absence of reward and phase  presence/
absence of reward interaction on whether the ﬁrst choice (ﬁrst
choice refers to the ﬁrst bowl the rat decided to forage in during
a trial) was correct/incorrect. The ﬁnal three GLMs investigated the
effects of treatment, experimental phase, time of day, reward and
rat (a random variable nested within treatment) on time to exit the
tunnel, time to choose a bowl and time to choose the correct bowl
(regardless of whether this was chosen ﬁrst or not). Where main
effects were signiﬁcant, post hoc Tukey honestly signiﬁcantdifference tests were used to investigate this further. Results were
considered signiﬁcant at P < 0.05.RESULTS
There was a signiﬁcant effect of treatment (ANOVA: F1,18 ¼ 6.54,
P ¼ 0.02) and a signiﬁcant treatment*time point interaction
(F1,18 ¼ 6.54, P ¼ 0.02) on number of optimistic responses during
the probe trials. The enriched treatment group demonstrated
signiﬁcantly more optimistic responses to the ambiguous stimuli
post-treatment than pretreatment. This was not the case for the
unenriched treatment group. Post-treatment optimistic responses
were also signiﬁcantly greater in the enriched treatment group
than post-treatment responses in the unenriched treatment group
(Fig. 2). There was no signiﬁcant difference in optimistic choices
between the enriched and unenriched treatment groups
pretreatment.
There was a signiﬁcant effect of phase on weight (F7,497 ¼ 267.81,
P< 0.01), with rats getting heavier as the phases progressed (i.e. they
weighed more at the end than at the start of the experiments).
During phase E, there was no effect of treatment on learning
rate. The unenriched treatment group took an average of six trials
to learn this phase, the enriched eight trials. There was no effect of
any factor onwhether the ﬁrst choice was correct or incorrect in all
four trials in phases E, F and F2 (where one random trial a day was
unrewarded).
There was a signiﬁcant main effect of experimental phase on
time to exit the tunnel (F6,1864 ¼ 13.61, P < 0.01), time to choose
a bowl (F6,1838 ¼ 20.94, P < 0.01) and time to choose the correct
bowl (F6,1728 ¼ 27.57, P < 0.01). Post hoc tests revealed that rats took
longer to exit the tunnel in phase C comparedwith all other phases,
and longer to choose a bowl and locate the correct bowl during
phases C and D compared with all other phases (Fig. 3aec). There
was a signiﬁcant effect of reward (chocolate versus Cheerio) on
time taken to exit the tunnel (F1,1864 ¼ 14.17, P < 0.01), time to
choose a bowl (F1,1838 ¼ 51.45, P < 0.01) and time to choose the
correct bowl (F1,1728 ¼ 53.76, P < 0.01), with rats moving faster
during the chocolate than the Cheerio trials (Fig. 4).DISCUSSION
Whenmoved to an enriched environment, rats responded more
optimistically to an ambiguous stimulus, meaning that they chose
to forage more frequently in a location previously associated with
a more highly valued food reward. This increase in optimism was
not observed in control rats that continued to experience unen-
riched conditions, and they preferentially chose to forage in a low-
value reward location in response to the same ambiguous stimulus.
These ﬁndings show for the ﬁrst time that provision of
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Figure 3. Time to: (a) exit tunnel; (b) choose a bowl; and (c) choose the correct bowl in all phases of the experiment. Error bars represent 1 SE. Points with an asterisk are
signiﬁcantly different from those without.
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in nonhuman animals.
The above results were obtained using a novel judgement bias
task modelled on an analogous approach recently developed for
starlings (Matheson et al. 2008; Brilot et al. 2010). The task involves50
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Figure 4. Time to exit tunnel, choose a bowl and choose the correct bowl during
chocolate versus Cheerio trials. Error bars represent 1 SE. Bars connected by an asterisk
are signiﬁcantly different from one another.animals learning a conditional discrimination whereby they had to
learn the correct response necessary to obtain a food reward given
the stimulus present during approach (rough or smooth sand-
paper). One stimulus was associated with a higher-valued reward
(chocolate) than the other (cereal). Once rats were trained on this
discrimination, judgement bias was assessed by exploring the rats’
responses to a novel, ambiguous stimulus (an intermediate grade of
sandpaper); a rat was deﬁned as optimistic if it chose the response
appropriate to the stimulus associated with the higher-valued
reward. This task has a number of advantages over some previous
tasks. Unlike previous go/no-go tasks (e.g. Harding et al. 2004;
Bateson & Matheson 2007), this task requires the rat to make an
active response to the ambiguous stimulus, thus reducing the
difﬁculties in interpretation of no-go responses (seeMatheson et al.
2008 for a discussion). Additionally, the task uses stimuli (textures
and odours) likely to be particularly salient to rats, with the
intention of reducing the time required by the rats to learn the
necessary discrimination (see Brilot et al. 2009 for a similar
approach in starlings).
Toverify that the rats had learned the conditional discrimination,
and were not using any cues directly associated with the rewards
themselves (e.g. the odour of the chocolate) to locate them, we
N.M. Brydges et al. / Animal Behaviour 81 (2011) 169e175174tested the rats’ performance in extinction (during phase E). Trials
were inserted in which rewards were randomly removed, and we
foundno effect of rewards being present or absent onwhether a rat’s
ﬁrst choice was correct or incorrect. We also showed that rats
responded faster as training progressed (exiting tunnel, choosing
bowl, ﬁnding correct bowl), indicating that they were learning the
task, and importantly, that therewasnoevidenceof extinctionwhen
unreinforced trials were introduced (see Brilot et al. 2010; Doyle
et al. 2010). Overall, rats were signiﬁcantly faster at responding
when the rewardwasa chocolatedrop (high reward) comparedwith
a Cheerio (low reward). This difference in latency suggests that we
had correctly determined the chocolate drop as the high-value
reward, and that it was clearly discriminable from the low reward.
Over the course of this study, the rats were housed in two stable
social groups. In the critical treatment phase of the experiment
(phase G), one group (enriched) wasmoved to a new cage furnished
with various forms of environmental enrichment, whereas the
other group (unenriched) was moved to a new cage identical to
their old one.We chose this design becausewe judged that it would
be less disruptive to task acquisition and performance to maintain
stable social groups throughout. However, concern has been raised
over using the behaviour of individuals from the same group as
independent measures (e.g. Weary & Fraser 1998). It has been
argued that behaviour of individuals from a particular group may
not be independent, owing to factors such as closer similarities in
genetics and shared social interactions. Hence, in our study, it could
be argued that some aspect of the cagemates’ social interactions,
perhaps related to the switch to an enriched environment but not
to enrichment per se, was responsible for the observed results.
With only one enriched and one unenriched cage, we effectively
have a sample size of one for testing the effect of enrichment, and
therefore cannot statistically dissociate the speciﬁc effects of
enrichment from other possible differences present between the
two groups of rats.
In response to the above potential criticism of our study, we
make the following points. First, care was taken that the two
groups of rats did not differ in any consistent way (other than the
imposed treatment). Genetically, these animals came from the
same stock and were randomly allocated to the two groups.
We also showed that there was no difference between the two
groups of rats in either rate of task acquisition or weight gain over
the course of the experiment. Second, it was not possible for there
to have been a direct effect of social interaction during the task, as
animals were tested individually. However, rats were with their
companions before and after task completion, which could theo-
retically inﬂuence their performance in the task. Any modiﬁca-
tions in social behaviour induced solely as a consequence of
housing environment can be seen as part of the enrichment. In
future studies, it would be interesting to tease apart which aspects
of enrichment are the most important in modifying behaviour: for
example, social versus physical enrichment. Finally, many
previous studies employing proper replication have shown posi-
tive welfare beneﬁts of environmental enrichment in laboratory
rats (e.g. Fernandez-Teruel et al. 2002; Van Loo et al. 2002;
Burman et al. 2006; Fox et al. 2006; Hansen et al. 2007). We
were merely using this proven effect to manipulate the state of
our rats in the current study. Therefore, the lack of replication of
the affective manipulation we used does not devalue our main
ﬁnding, that provision of environmental enrichment is associated
with an increase in optimism.
A previous study used a cognitive bias task to investigate
starlings’ responses to being moved from unenriched to enriched
cages, but found no evidence for an increase in optimistic
responses (Bateson & Matheson 2007). A potentially signiﬁcant
difference between the two studies that could account for thedifference in ﬁndings is that the starlings had extensive experi-
ence of enriched cages and aviaries before the experiment. By
contrast, the rats used in the current study were experiencing
enriched conditions for the very ﬁrst time during the treatment
phase. It is therefore possible that being moved from unenriched
to enriched cages was accompanied by different emotional
responses in the two experiments: the rats may have experienced
a greater emotional response than the starlings owing to the
novelty of the enrichments. Further experiments are needed to
test this hypothesis.
Our results provide further support for the welfare beneﬁts
afforded by the provision of environmental enrichment for captive
animals. Previous studies have shown that enrichment leads to
reduction of stereotypies and signs of apparent frustration
(Balcombe 2006; Mason et al. 2007). By analogy with data from
humans, our results suggest that provision of environmental
enrichment might also engender a more positive affective state in
rats. They further suggest that lack of enrichment is likely to be
associated with poor welfare and negative affect. Before treatment
when all rats were housed in unenriched cages, rats from both
groups chose to forage predominantly (more than 50% of the time,
or chance) in the low-reward location in response to the ambig-
uous stimulus (the pessimistic response). It might appear that an
alternative explanation for this ﬁnding is that the ambiguous
probe used (intermediate-grade sandpaper) was in fact closer in
texture to the low-reward grade of sandpaper. However, this is
highly unlikely, as the grade of sandpaper (coarse or ﬁne) asso-
ciated with the high or low reward was counterbalanced between
groups. Our results therefore add to previous work in starlings and
rats showing that animals in unenriched housing typically exhibit
more pessimistic cognitive biases (Bateson & Matheson 2007;
Burman et al. 2008a). This suggests that, potentially, present
provision of standard laboratory housing is inadequate for the
maintenance of good mental welfare in laboratory animal species
studied thus far. Around 3.7 million scientiﬁc procedures are
started annually on laboratory animals, the majority using rodents
(77%, according to Home Ofﬁce statistics: Ofﬁce for National
Statistics 2008). Owing to the vast numbers of such animals
used in scientiﬁc research, we have a responsibility to safeguard
their mental as well as physical welfare, not just from an ethical
standpoint but also to ensure the quality and consistency of
experimental data.
In conclusion, we have developed a novel, simple foraging task
that can be used to measure cognitive bias in rats. We have shown
that rats trained on this task show pessimistic responses when
housed in unenriched cages but switch to optimistic responses
whenmoved to enriched cages. Our task therefore has potential for
detecting both negative and positive affective states in animals. The
further validation and use of this task will be of great importance
for the assessment of animal welfare and may also represent an
improved method for assessing the preclinical efﬁcacy of potential
novel mood-altering therapeutics.Acknowledgments
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